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EUTHANASIA IN AMERICA - PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A REVIEW OF A 
MERCIFUL END AND FORCED EXIT 
Edward J. Larson* 
MERCIFUL END: THE EUTHANASIA MOVEMENT IN MODERN 
AMERICA. By Ian Dowbiggin. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 2003. 
Pp. xix, 250. $28. 
FORCED EXIT: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM ASSISTED SUICIDE TO 
LEGALIZED MURDER. By Wesley J. Smith. Dallas: Spence Publ'g Co. 
2003. Pp. xxii, 364. Paper, $17.95. 
Nearly 170 years ago, in the classic first volume of his Democracy 
in America, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "Scarcely any political 
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or 
later, into a judicial question."1 De Tocqueville viewed this as a 
peculiarly U.S. development. He attributed it to the authority of the 
judiciary in the United States to review governmental enactments and 
establish individual rights based on judicial interpretation of the 
federal and state constitution. "Whenever a law that the judge holds to 
be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he 
may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to 
the U.S. magistrate, but it give rise to immense political influence,"  de 
Tocqueville explained.2 He then commented, "But as soon as a judge 
has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law immediately 
loses a portion of its moral force. "3 The same can be said of individual 
rights: those decreed by the Supreme Court carry added moral force, 
those denied by that Court carry less moral force. To some extent, 
Americans conflate morality with constitutionality. The relevance of 
this observation in a review of two books about efforts to legalize 
physician-assisted death, Ian Dowbiggin's4 A Merciful End and Wesley 
* Talmadge Professor of Law and Russell Professor of History, University of Georgia. 
B.A. 1974, Williams College; M.A., 1976, Ph.D., 1984, University of Wisconsin-Madison; 
J.D., 1979, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Alfred A. Knopf 1945). 
2. Id. at 101. 
3. Id. at 102. 
4. Professor of History, University of Prince Edward Island. 
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J. Smith's5 Forced Exit, should become apparent later - but for now, 
permit me to elaborate on the general observation. 
Of course, de Tocqueville's equation of the constitutional, the 
political, and the moral does not apply in every case. In his majority 
opinion in the 1857 Dred Scott case, Chief Justice Roger Taney 
articulated a constitutional right for citizens who legally owned slaves 
under state law to take that "property" into United States territories 
where slavery was outlawed under federal or territorial statutes.6 He 
did this with the hope of resolving the most pressing political and 
moral question of his day in favor of the extension of slavery into 
supposedly free territories. The attempt backfired badly as free-soil 
moderates joined radical abolitionists in denouncing the Court and its 
ruling. For example, Illinois trial lawyer Abraham Lincoln attributed 
the judicial decision to the ruling Democratic political dynasty in 
Washington, and called for the people "to meet and overthrow the 
power of that dynasty" to prevent it from pushing its pro-slavery 
agenda through the courts.7 After he was elected president in 1860 at 
least in part on his promise to roll back Dred Scott, Southern 
Democrats pushed their states to secede from the Union. The ballot 
box and the battle field (rather than constitutional adjudication) 
ultimately resolved that particular political and moral question, 8 with 
the 13th Amendment effectively overruling Dred Scott in 1865. 
Dred Scott is more the exception than the rule, however. 
Throughout our nation's history, many hotly contested political issues 
were resolved, without conflict, by judicial decisions. Three examples 
spanning the past half-century illustrate the rule. Following a virtual 
tie in Florida that left no clear winner in the 2000 presidential election, 
Bush v. Gore9 - despite deep and continuing objections to the case in 
5. Attorney and popular writer. 
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857). 
7. Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided: Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois, at the 
Close of the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1856), in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF 
AMERICAN LITERATURE 1587 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 5th ed. 1998). 
8. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 691, 715-16 (2004) ("It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Civil War 
repudiated the notion that the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements are binding 
on all other actors in our constitutional system, but not by very much. Lincoln campaigned 
against the binding nature of Dred Scott, other than as a rule of decision for the parties in 
that particular case. He campaigned against popular acquiescence in a potential "Second 
Dred Scott" opinion that might confirm and extend the original, and introduce a requirement 
that Northern states tolerate slavery within their borders. In a very real sense, Lincoln's 
election constituted an electoral rejection of the Supreme Court's supremacy in matters of 
constitutional law. The South's attempted secession was a rejection of the validity of that 
electoral rejection and of the constitutional views of the North more generally. Lincoln's 
rejection of secession, in turn, rejected the legitimacy of the South's constitutional 
objections. And so the issue was joined, and would be determined on the battlefield."). 
9. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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many quarters - effectively decided the political question of who 
became president in 2001. Al Gore accepted the Court's majority 
opinion as final and his partisans did not take to the streets in protest 
- as perhaps might have happened in countries with a different 
attitude toward judicial power. Another example occurred a quarter 
century earlier, when, after months of resisting judicial and 
congressional subpoenas, President Richard Nixon complied with the 
Supreme Court's order in United States v. Nixon10 directing him to tum 
over the so-called Watergate tapes to the Watergate special 
prosecutor. This led to Nixon's resignation from office two weeks 
later. Here, as in Gore, political questions were resolved by judicial 
decisions. In a yet earlier example, President Dwight Eisenhower sent 
federal troops into the Deep South to enforce federal court orders 
decreeing the desegregation of public schools, despite his personal 
objections to those rulings. He thereby gave teeth to the enforcement 
of the Court's pronouncements in Brown v. Board of Education.11 
Together, those judicial pronouncements and the resultant executive 
actions led to the end of de jure segregation in public education, which 
was arguably the most difficult political and moral question of the 
1950s. 
As a political and moral question in the United States, euthanasia 
may not rise to the same historic level of significance as school 
desegregation or the abolition of slavery, but during the 1990s, as A 
Merciful End and Forced Exit show, it commanded considerable 
public attention. Best-selling books, articles, and television programs 
promoted the concept of mercy killing to a wide audience (Smith, pp. 
12-35). Activist groups supporting the legalization of physician­
assisted suicide or medical eutl:).anasia, such as the Hemlock Society 
and Compassion in Dying, sprang up and gained visibility (Smith, p. 
172; Dowbiggin, p. 162). Bills on the topic surfaced in state legislatures 
around the country and voters in five states faced ballot initiatives to 
legalize physician-assisted suicide, with one of them, the Oregon 
Death With Dignity Act, passing by a 51 % to 49% margin in 1994 
(Dowbiggin, pp. 167-71).12 In New York and Washington State, 
concerned physicians and patients filed suits in federal court to 
overturn state statutes against assisting suicide.13 
As those lawsuits wound their way to the United States Supreme 
Court in 1997,1 4 they became the focal point of the political and moral 
10. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
12. In addition to Oregon in 1994, the other four states were Washington (1991), 
California (1992), Michigan (1998), and Maine (2000). 
13. At least in so far as those laws prohibited physicians from honoring requests from 
competent, terminally ill patients for aid in dying. Smith, pp. 161-68. 
14. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
1248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:1245 
debate over euthanasia in the United States. When the Court handed 
down its decision refusing to recognize a constitutionally protected 
liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, the entire issue largely 
disappeared from the headlines. The political debate subsided 
virtually overnight. This occurred despite the fact that the justices -
both·in the majority and concurring opinions - expressly reserved the 
matter to resolution through state political processes and did not even 
purport to have resolved the constitutional issue for all time.1 5 
Although A Merciful End and the revised and updated edition of 
Forced Exit were published in 2003, they contain surprisingly little 
about the Supreme Court's 1997 decisions in Glucksburg and Quill. 
Although A Merciful End purports to cover the history of the 
euthanasia movement in the United States from roughly 1900 to "the 
1990s and beyond" (Dowbiggin, p. 163), it relegates this final period to 
a cursory concluding chapter. Forced Exit is not history. It is written in 
the present tense, but was first published in 1997 (before the Supreme 
Court rulings). Revisions for the 2003 edition did not alter the book's 
basic style and substance. Smith made little effort to integrate the 
Supreme Court rulings into his critique of physician-assisted suicide, 
perhaps because they did not neatly fit his slippery-slope analysis. 
These two books tell us much about the public debate before the 
Supreme Court rulings, but little about those rulings or their 
aftermath. In this review, I will summarize and comment on both 
books as well as the Supreme Court's opinions in Glucksburg and 
Quill. 
I. A MERCIFUL END 
The misappropriately (or perhaps ironically) titled book, A 
Merciful End, is a history of the euthanasia movement in the United 
States that portrays its leaders as only secondarily interested in 
providing a merciful end for suffering patients. Instead, Dowbiggin 
presents a picture of a movement with deep social Darwinian and 
eugenic currents (Dowbiggin, p. 16). Even for those leaders of the 
euthanasia movement whose concerns centered on the suffering 
patient rather than society, Dowbiggin implies that the fruit of their 
labor may be infected by mistake, abuse, and short-sightedness 
(Dowbiggin, pp. 155-56 (case of Dax Cowert), pp. 164-69 (cases of 
Nancy Cruzan, "Debbie," and Janet Adkins)). 
Although euthanasia has long roots in Western culture, Dowbiggin 
begins his account around 1990, during the heyday of social 
Darwinism and the dawn of eugenics. The book's subtitle - "The 
15. Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997); id. at 788-89 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
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Euthanasia Movement in Modem America" - is more descriptive of 
the book's contents than its title. Euthanasia is revealed to be a very 
modem way of dying. Dowbiggin depicts the utilitarian, anticlerical, 
pervasively Darwinian euthanasia movement as an archetypical 
manifestation of the modem reform impulse. Fittingly, the movement 
begins in The United States around the tum of the Twentieth Century 
with champions like Progressive political orator Robert Ingersoll, 
Ethical Culture movement founder Felix Adler, and popular socialist 
author Jack London. These and other Progressive Era champions of 
euthanasia saw suicide as a rational choice for the terminally ill, and 
mercy killing as appropriate for those suffering severe physical or 
mental disabilities (Dowbiggin, pp. .155-56). Dowbiggin's account 
suggests that the United States' failure to embrace their arguments for 
euthanasia reflects a cultural hesitancy to accept the full implications 
of rational modernity, which is characterized by a naturalistic, 
utilitarian view of life. Perhaps there is some sentiment and 
superstition left in us, at least when confronted with death. 
A Merciful End is fundamentally a work of institutional history, 
and it is the well-researched story of the Euthanasia Society of 
America (the "ESA") and successor organizations that the book tells 
in impressive detail. After chronicling the emergence during the 
Progressive Era of early calls for legalizing euthanasia, Dowbiggin hits 
his stride through his description of ESA's founding during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Charles Francis Potter, a Baptist minister 
turned radical secularist who founded the New York City Humanist 
Society, and Ann Mitchell, a New York heiress who Dowbiggin 
describes as psychologically "unstable," served as the driving force 
behind the ESA, at least until Potter resigned as ESA president in 
1938 due to inadequate pay and Mitchell jumped from a window to 
her death in 1942 (Dowbiggin, pp. 36-54). Dowbiggin includes such 
tidbits of ESA history to show the character of its leaders. Potter and 
Mitchell warmly endorsed eugenics and advocated euthanasia for both 
the disabled and the terminally ill. As Dowbiggin documents in detail, 
the small, Manhattan-based organization's boards and councils were 
dominated by an elite corps of eugenicists, including modernist 
minister Henry Emerson Fosdick, progressive sociologist Edward A. 
Ross, psychologist H. H. Goddard, biologist Arthur Estabrook, birth­
control advocate Margaret Sanger, and geneticist C. C. Little 
(Dowbiggin, p. 54). 
After a promising start in the 1930s, the euthanasia movement fell 
on hard times during the 1940s. During the 1930s and early 1940s, the 
Nazi government in Germany had systematically euthanized large 
numbers of sick or infirm patiems in addition to implementing their 
final solution for Jews, and Dowbiggin places some of the blame on 
Germans who supported euthanasia before the war, "no matter what 
their intentions" <Dowbiggin, pp. 67-71). Linking euthanasia to Nazism 
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discredited the practice in the United States, especially after the 
United States joined the war against Germany in 1941. Illustrating just 
how out of step Potter fell from popular opinion as the United States 
turned against the scientific materialism that characterized Nazi 
Germany, he actually suggested legalizing euthanasia to provide a 
"merciful release" for disabled veterans returning from World War 
Two (Dowbiggin, pp. 72-73). By examining the eugenic, utilitarian 
thinking of early ESA leaders and equating it to the reasoning of 
German physicians whose support for euthanasia helped lay the 
foundations for the Nazi death camps, Dowbiggin presents mercy 
killing for some (at least as conceived during the 1930s) as a slippery 
slope leading all too predictably to fatal results for many. 
Virtually without support in the 1950s, the U.S. euthanasia 
movement revived in the 1960s and 1970s with a revised agenda. The 
paramount message became the autonomy of suffering, terminally ill 
patients to decide when and how their lives should end (Dowbiggin, 
pp. 97-98). Certainly the advent of life-sustaining treatments spurred 
the quest for greater patient control, but Dowbiggin ties revived 
interest in euthanasia more to cultural than to medical developments 
<nowbiggin, pp. 110-18>· Individuals simply expected greater control 
over their bodies; and this shift in public opinion gave new life to the 
euthanasia movement. Episcopal theologian Joseph Fletcher, an 
influential proponent of situational ethics, emerged as a leader within 
the ESA. Aligning itself with these cultural developments, in 1974 the 
organization also changed its name from the old-fashioned sounding 
Euthanasia Society of America, replete with Nazi implications, to the 
more liberal-sounding Society for the Right to Die, in tune with the 
individual-rights ethos of late twentieth-century America. Showing a 
similar concern for semantics, its sister organization, the Euthanasia 
Education Fund, became Concern for Dying soon after. These 
organizations gradually changed their focus from championing state­
sponsored euthanasia to advocating living wills and physician aid in 
dying - although Fletcher remained an old-line eugenicist who saw 
social benefit in selective mercy killing (Dowbiggin, pp. 100-18). As 
they changed, he gradually lost influence within them. During the 1980s 
and early 1990s, Derek Humphry's Hemlock Society and Jack 
Kevorkian's shock tactics championed some of the ESA's more radical 
positions as the ESA's own successors moved toward the middle 
(Dowbiggin, pp. 149, 154, 165-67). 
A Merciful End tracks these historical developments with a critic's 
eye for details highlighting the elitist or eugenic roots for a movement 
that now presents itself as promoting individual rights and patient 
autonomy. Dowbiggin is a historian of medicine, however, not a 
journalist or lawyer. He all but drops the narrative with the passage of 
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act in 1994. Readers more interested 
in current legal developments than the history of a social movement 
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should be forewarned - Dowbiggin's book barely mentions the 
Supreme Court rulings in Quill and Glucksberg, devoting less than a 
paragraph to those two signal cases before concluding the account a 
scant three pages later <Dowbiggin, p. 173). It tells us nothing of their 
impact on the ongoing debate, and leaves the reader with the dire 
warning that "the floodgates dreaded by the anti-euthanasia forces 
may swing wide open at some point in the not too distant future" 
(Dowbiggin, p. 176). 
In the book's concluding paragraph, Dowbiggin throws his lot in 
with those anti-euthanasia forces. Current proponents of euthanasia 
may be well-meaning, he writes, and speak of their deep commitment 
to relieve human suffering. "However, the history of euthanasia in 
America suggest this is a simplistic diagnosis of a gravely complex 
social, political, economic, and cultural matter," Dowbiggin concludes. 
"Talk of a right to die raises the troubling questions: once legalized for 
the dying, who can be denied such a right?" Once granted to some, 
many infirm, depressed, or simply suicidal persons might claim it too, 
he fears, and parents or other surrogate decisionmakers might demand 
it on behalf of minors or other incompetents. Further, Dowbiggin 
worries that, once a legal right to die is established, the infirm and 
disabled might feel obligated to exercise that right to lessen the 
burden that they impose on society and family members. "Where does 
the freedom to die end and the duty to die begin?" he asks (Dowbiggin, 
pp. 176-77). These are slippery-slope questions of the type that 
University of Michigan legal scholar Yale Kamisar has posed with 
great force against the legalization of euthanasia for nearly fifty 
years.1 6 A Merciful End provides a rich historical context for 
considering these critical questions in light of how past proponents of 
euthanasia conceptualized the issue. Dowbiggin shows that many 
leaders of the euthanasia movement in the United States favored a 
broad right to die and that some acknowledged at least a limited social 
duty to die in certain circumstances. Their reasoning led in that 
direction. At least for now, however, the legal limits against assisted 
suicide and euthanasia have held firm against the best arguments that 
euthanasia enthusiasts could muster. 
16. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy­
Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958); Yale Kamisar, The Rise and Fall of the 
"Right" to Assisted Suicide, in THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO 
END-OF-LIFE CARE 69-93 (Kathleen & Herbert Hendin eds., 2002). In 1994 Kamisar wrote: 
Why should the non-terminal nature of a person's suffering disqualify her as a candidate for 
assisted suicide? If personal autonomy and the termination of suffering are the key factors 
fueling the right to assisted suicide, how can we exclude those with non-terminal illnesses or 
disabilities who might have to endure greater suffering over a much longer period of time? 
Why should a quadriplegic or a person afflicted with severe arthritis have to continue to live 
what she considers an intolerable existence for a number of years? Why doesn't such a 
person have an equal claim - or even a greater one - to assisted suicide? 
Yale Kamisar, After Assisted Suicide, What Next?, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 26. 
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II. FORCED EXIT 
Where A Merciful End looks to the history of the euthanasia 
movement, Forced Exit focuses on its present manifestation, at least as 
author Wesley J. Smith viewed it in 1997, when he initially published 
the book. In 1994, Oregon passed its Death With Dignity Act, enacted 
as a voter initiative to authorize physicians to prescribe lethal drugs in 
certain cases to their competent, terminally ill patients. In 1996, two 
federal appellate courts held that the due process or equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment barred states from prohibiting 
physician-assisted suicide.1 7 To Smith, it seemed as if the media were 
promoting physician-assisted suicide as well. Smith wrote Forced Exit 
in response to a friend's suicide after discovering that the friend had 
been encouraged by literature from Hemlock Society. His purpose in 
writing the book was to expose the slippery-slope-type dangers posed 
by physician-assisted suicide and denounce the legal and cultural in­
roads the euthanasia movement had made in recent years (Smith, pp. 
xviii-xxix). 
A lawyer and writer of popular, advocacy-oriented books, 
including four with consumer advocate Ralph Nader, Smith's Forced 
Exit assaults physician-assisted suicide much like Nader's Unsafe at 
Any Speed18 assaulted Corvairs - with a drumbeat of emotional 
examples and frightening facts aimed at a popular audience. The 
book's subtitle summarizes its argument: "The Slippery Slope from 
Assisted Suicide to Legalized Murder." As Smith presents it, this 
slippery slope is a greased slide. Even though the Supreme Court in 
Glicksburg and Quill reversed the two appellate court decisions 
(Smith, p. 168 (addition to 2003 edition)), no state has followed 
Oregon's lead in legalizing physician-assisted suicide (Smith, pp. 264-
65 (addition to 2003 edition)), and media attention to the issue has 
lessened, the 2003 edition of Forced Exit is as shrill as the 1997 edition. 
Smith has added a paragraph here or a sentence there to reflect 
intervening developments, but the substance remains the same. He has 
neither deleted nor rewritten anything of significance from the 1997 
text. 
A vitriolic, two-part thesis runs through Forced Exit from the first 
to the last page. As Smith sees it, legally allowing patients of any 
particular type (such as the terminally ill or the severely disabled) 
either to die or to choose death represents a societal decision to 
discount the value of those persons. He fears that once some are 
viewed as expendable, others will be as well. He sets the tone in 
17. Compassion in Dying v. State, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (due process); Quill v. 
Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996) (equal protection). 
18. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE 
AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965). 
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Chapter One by linking the current "euthanasia consciousness" 
(Smith, p. 18) to the "quality-of-life ethic" espoused by Princeton 
University ethicist Peter Singer, whose 1994 book Rethinking Life and 
Death19 Smith damns as "the Mein Kampf of the euthanasia 
movement" (Smith, p. 25). 
In Chapter Two, Smith pushes his thesis though case studies. He 
tells the stories of four severely cognitively disabled patients, including 
Nancy Cruzan, who, during the late 1980s or early 1990s, became the 
subject of highly publicized legal battles over the termination of 
artificially administered nutrition and hydration (or food and fluid) 
<smith, pp. 53-56>. None of these patients could speak to request the 
termination of treatment. Family members purported to speak for 
them. Smith presents these patients as victims of a legal system that 
allowed others to decide their fate. He titles the chapter, "Disposable 
People." It concludes with the warning, "The food and fluids cases 
have desensitized people to medical killing, leading to wider 
application of induced death as the answer to 'serious maladies" 
(Smith, p. 80). Smith claims that "the dehydration cases have been 
used as a springboard for arguments to legalize euthanasia and 
assisted suicide for the many" <smith, p. 80). Here is the slippery-slope 
argument pushed back by Smith to indict an earlier, generally settled 
legal precedent, articulated in Cruzan v. Director2° and elsewhere, 
holding that severely disabled or terminally ill patients have a 
constitutional right to refuse life-prolonging nutrition and hydration 
either themselves or through a surrogate acting on their behalf. Rather 
than see this right as affirming a person's autonomy in medical 
decisionmaking, Smith condemns it as denying the patient's human 
worth by allowing them to die by discontinuing food and fluids. 21 
Depending on the particular case, either view could be valid - but 
Cruzan seemingly settled the matter in favor of autonomy in 1990, by 
which time most states had enacted some statutory procedures for 
individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including artificially 
administered nutrition and hydration.22 
Chapter Three recounts the horrors of Nazi euthanasia practices, 
which began in 1939 with the killing of severely handicapped 
19. PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR 
TRADITIONAL ETHICS (1994). 
20. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
21. In the course of discussing these cases, Smith writes, "Once we accept the idea that 
some lives are not worth living, once we come to see as proper the intentional ending of lives 
of the profoundly disabled, once we claim the right to judge who should live and die on the 
basis of subjective standards such as happiness, quality of life, or dignity, we have created a 
disposable caste." Pp. 71-72. 
22. See Thomas A. Eaton & Edward J. Larson, Experimenting with the "Right to Die" in 
the Laboratory of the States, 25 GA. L. REV. 1253, 1300-1318 (1991). 
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newborns but quickly spread to include some mentally and physically 
disabled adults and other so-called "useless eaters" (Smith, pp. 84-97). 
In accord with the chapter's title, "Everything Old Is New Again," 
Smith proceeds to argue that the United States is sliding in the same 
direction, using as evidence selected quotes from Judge Steven 
Reinhardt's 1996 majority opinion in the Ninth Circuit decision 
finding a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.23 
Attempting to show parallels in their reasoning, Smith sets 
Reinhardt's statements against those of early proponents of the 
German euthanasia program (Smith, pp. 100-02). This is an untenable 
jump. Reinhardt was addressing the compelling case of conscious, 
terminally-ill, pain-racked patients who knowingly request a 
physician's aid in dying; the Nazi euthanasia program disposed of the 
disabled without their consent based on social considerations. The two 
are fundamentally different. 
Having presented the two extremes - the right to refuse life­
sustaining medical treatment and the Nazi gas chambers - the 
ensuing chapters attempt to fill in the connecting links. There are 
chapters on the ongoing Dutch experiment with legalized medical 
euthanasia (highlighting how that program has, despite legal 
guidelines to the contrary, expanded beyond consenting, terminally ill 
adults), the effort to legalize physician-assisted suicide in various 
states within the United States, the supposed financial incentives 
within the United States' healthcare system that might encourage the 
practice of euthanasia in some cases, and the alleged cultural bias 
against disabled or dying individuals that sees their lives as not worth 
living. These are standard arguments against opening the door even a 
crack to euthanasia, restated here with considerable force. In the 
course of raising these objections to physician-assisted suicide, Smith 
attempts to answer the common claims that euthanasia promotes 
individual freedom and autonomy. In his calculus, the risks of mistake, 
abuse, and malice in the practice of euthanasia outweigh any potential 
benefits. "Legalizing killing by doctors could even become a way for a 
few very unscrupulous doctors to cover up their malpractice," Smith 
claims at one point (Smith, p. 190). Forced Exit concludes with a plea 
for providing better care and more compassion for the dying and 
disabled. Hospice and pain-management are Smith's answers to calls 
for death with dignity. In his brief final paragraph, Smith writes: "The 
two paths that lie before us, the death culture or the struggle toward a 
truly caring community, lead to dramatically different futures. The 
choice is ours. So will be the society we create" (Smith, p. 316). Forced 
Exit is one long polemic against physician-assisted suicide, medical 
euthanasia, and the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment, yet it 
23. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). 
May2004] Euthanasia in America 1255 
relies almost exclusively on slippery-slope reasoning. To accept his 
conclusion, one must accept his reasoning - that physician-assisted 
suicide, once legal, will snowball. 
III. GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL 
Perhaps because of their scope or purpose, neither book offers a 
sustained analysis of the Supreme Court's 1997 Glucksberg and Quill 
decisions or their impact on the euthanasia movement in the United 
States. By their terms, those decisions should not end the debate over 
physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia and this alone could justify 
Dowbiggin and Smith in ignoring their impact on that debate.2 4 To the 
contrary, the Court purports simply to shift the debate from federal 
courts into legislative chambers and the public square.2 5 For a topic 
like euthanasia, which potentially impacts all Americans, I find this 
healthy - and generally agree with the Court here. Nevertheless, I 
believe that the decisions have profoundly impacted the policy debate 
- perhaps more than the justices expected. Although all nine justices 
agreed that states could constitutionally outlaw physician-assisted 
suicide, they differed somewhat in their reasoning. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the two opinions of the 
Court (one in Glucksberg and the other in Quill) in which five of the 
nine justices joined. In upholding the Washington statute in 
Glucksberg, he wrote, "[T]he question before us is whether the 
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right 
to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing 
so. "26 To answer this question, the Chief Justice adopted what he 
described as the "established method of substantive-due-process 
analysis,"27 which begins with the principle "that the Due Process 
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which 
are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition.' "28 In the course of his subsequent review of the relevant 
history and tradition, he concluded that to find such a right to assisted 
suicide, "we would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and 
practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every 
State."29 So stated, such a finding would fly in the face of the nation's 
24. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787-88 (1997). 
25. See, e.g., id. at 735; id. at 736 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
26. Id. at 723. 
27. Id. at 720. 
28. Id. at 720-21. 
29. Id. at 723. 
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history and tradition. That, he suggested, is not the Court's role in a 
democratic society.30 
In his separate opinion upholding the New York statute, the Chief 
Justice rejected the corollary equal-protection argument embraced by 
the appellate court in Quill. The constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection does not require a state, simply because it allows terminally 
ill persons on life support to die by having their physicians discontinue 
life-sustaining treatment, to also allow terminally ill patients not on 
life support to die by having their physicians supply life-ending 
treatment.31 The two classes are not equivalent. Rehnquist reasoned: 
This conclusion depends on the submission that ending or refusing 
lifesaving medical treatment "is nothing more nor less than assisted 
suicide." Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between 
assisting suicide and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction 
widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our 
legal traditions, is both important and logical; it is certainly rational.32 
In both opinions, the Chief Justice described legitimate 
governmental interests served by outlawing physician-assisted suicide 
and distinguishing between what he characterized as "letting a patient 
die and making that patient die."33 As he summarized them, those 
interests include "prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; 
preventing suicide; maintaining physicians' role as their patients' 
healers; protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice, and 
psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a 
possible slide towards euthanasia."3 4  Yet the Court did not purport to 
see those interests as so compelling or certain as to bar states from 
legalizing physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, the Chief Justice noted 
"We need not weigh exactingly the relative strengths of these various 
interests,"35 and appended a concluding observation: "Throughout the 
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate 
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted 
suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a 
democratic society."36 Indeed, as suggested by the Chief Justice's 
earlier comment about the absence of a historical tradition for 
physician-assisted suicide in the United States, this debate is largely a 
30. Id. at 719, 735. 
31. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997). 
32. Id. at 800-01 (citing Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 7 16, 729 (1996)). 
33. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 807; see also id. at 806-09 (discussing the governmental interests 
served by outlawing physician-assisted suicide); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728-36 (same). 
34. Vacca, 521 U.S. at 808-09. 
35. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
36. Id. 
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new one in our country. For him, this makes it all the more 
appropriate for legislative rather than judicial resolution at this time. 
Although they concurred in the judgment upholding these two 
state laws against assisted suicide, five of the Court's more moderate 
or liberal justices filed or joined separate opinions expressing their 
views on the limits of state power to ban physician aid in dying. For 
example, in their concurring opinions, Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Sandra Day O'Connor stressed that the availability of palliative care 
weighed heavily in their decisions to reject the claimed right to 
physician-assisted suicide.3 7  "That is because, in my view, the 
avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would have 
to constitute an essential part of any successful claim and because, as 
Justice O'Connor points out, the laws before us do not force a dying 
person to undergo that kind of pain," Breyer wrote.3 8 "Medical 
technology, we are repeatedly told, makes the administration of pain­
relieving drugs sufficient, except for a very few individuals for whom 
the ineffectiveness of pain control medicines can mean not pain, but 
the need for sedation which can end in a coma," he added.3 9  Given 
such pain-control options, O'Connor wrote in her opinion, "the State's 
interests in protecting those who are not truly competent or facing 
imminent death, or those whose decisions to hasten death would not 
truly be voluntary, are sufficiently weighty to justify a prohibition 
against physician-assisted suicide." 4° For these justices, this societal 
interest in protecting these large classes of vulnerable patients 
outweighed the individual interests of the few competent, terminally­
ill patients who might voluntarily decide to hasten death. As 
O'Connor stated, "The difficulty in defining terminal illness and the 
risk that a dying patient's request for assistance in ending his or her 
life might not be truly voluntary justifies the prohibitions on assisted 
suicide we uphold here. " 41 
Although agreeing that the "potential harms [associated with the 
practice of physician-assisted suicide] are sufficient to support the 
State's general public policy against assisted suicide,"42 Justice John 
Paul Stevens carried the concern about unmanageable pain a step 
further, and expanded it to include suffering generally. 43 "Encouraging 
the development and ensuring the availability of adequate pain 
37. Id. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
38. Id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
39. Id. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
joined O'Connor's opinion. 
40. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
41. Id. at 738 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
42. Id. at 749 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
43. Id. at 746-48 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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treatment is of utmost importance; palliative care, however, cannot 
alleviate all pain and suffering," he noted in his concurring opinion. 4 4  
"An individual adequately informed of the care alternatives thus 
might make a rational choice for assisted suicide. For such an 
individual, the State's interest in preventing potential abuse and 
mistake is only minimally implicated," Stevens asserted. 4 5  Such an 
individual might possess a constitutionally recognizable right to 
assisted suicide, he suggested, though not necessarily one that would 
overturn general state laws against assisted suicide.46 
Justice David Souter placed even stronger qualifications on his 
concurrence in upholding the assisted-suicide statutes. "The patients 
here sought not only an end to pain (which they might have had, 
although perhaps at the price of stupor) but an end to their short 
remaining lives with a dignity that they believed would be denied them 
by po�erful pain medication, as well as by their consciousness of 
dependency and helplessness as they approached death," he wrote. 47 
"In my judgment, the importance of the individual interest here . . .  
cannot be gainsaid."48 Yet he concluded that, at least for now, it was 
outweighed by the state's interests in "protecting life generally, 
discouraging suicide even if knowing and voluntary, and protecting 
terminally ill patients from involuntary suicide and euthanasia, both 
voluntary and nonvoluntary."49 In Souter's opinion, "The case for the 
slippery slope is fairly made out here . . . because there is a plausible 
case that the right claimed would not be readily containable." The 
case is only plausible, he stressed, and opined that the evidence on this 
point from "the Dutch experience" was mixed. 50 Souter concluded, 
"The day may come when we can say with some assurance which side 
is right, but for now it is the substantiality of the factual disagreement, 
and the alternatives for resolving it, that matter. They are, for me, 
dispositive of the due process claim at this time."51 
Such concerns and qualifications led the concurring justices to 
amplify the Chief Justice's call for state legislatures to address the 
issue.52 In an opinion joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, O'Connor wrote: 
44. Id. at 747 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
45. Id. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
47. Id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring). 
48. Id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring). 
49. Id. (citations omitted). 
50. Id. at 785-86 (Souter, J., concurring). 
51. Id. at 786 (Souter, J., concurring). 
52. Id. at 735. 
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Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family 
member's terminal illness. There is no reason to think the democratic 
process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of 
terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end 
their suffering and the State's interests in protecting those who might 
seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.53 
In his opinion, Stevens added, "There remains room for vigorous 
debate about the outcome of particular cases that are not necessarily 
resolved by the opinions announced today. "54 For his part, Souter all 
but demanded legislative "experimentation" with "an emerging issue 
like assisted suicide. "55 Although conceding that the judiciary should 
"stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration" of the 
issue, he warned, "I do not decide for all time that respondents' claim 
[of a right to physician-assisted suicide] should not be recognized. "56 
IV. CONCLUSION: DEATH AFTER GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL 
Taken together, these various opinions by the justices in 
Glucksberg and Quill suggest that, far from resolving the issue of 
euthanasia, the Supreme Court rulings should simply have opened a 
new, and probably more intense, phase of the public-policy debate 
over physician-assisted suicide and medical euthanasia. That has not 
happened. The national conversation on these issues has been muted 
since the Supreme Court spoke. There have been only two voter 
initiatives or referendums on physician-assisted suicide since 1997, one 
in Michigan and another in Maine. Both lost without generating much 
national attention <smith, p. 171). In A Merciful End, Dowbiggin 
characterized them as "demoralizing defeats for right-to-die 
proponents" <nowbiggin, p. xviii.>· In his concurring opinion in 
Glucksberg, Justice Souter suggested that in-depth analysis of "the 
Dutch experience" with medical euthanasia might resolve the U.S. 
public-policy debate over the issue, but leading researchers continue 
to disagree over the lessons learned from that experience.57 In their 
books, both Dowbiggin and Smith report that, in all too many cases, 
Dutch physicians violate the law by euthanizing patients without their 
consent (Dowbiggin, p. 169; Smith, pp. 114-20). 
53. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
54. Id. at 752 (Stevens, J ., concurring). 
55. Id. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring). 
56. Id. 
57. Compare ROBERT POOL, NEGOTIATING A GOOD DEATH: EUTHANASIA IN THE 
NETHERLANDS (2000) (favorable), with HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH: 
DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE (1998) (unfavorable). 
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Souter concluded his concurring opinion by urging more state 
legislatures to experiment with legalizing physician-assisted suicide,58 
but this too has not happened. Since voter passage of Oregon's Death 
With Dignity Act, no state has legalized physician-assisted suicide and 
three states have enacted specific prohibitions against assisted suicide 
(Smith, p. 171, 265). Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its rulings 
in Glucksberg and Quill, the Florida Supreme Court refused to find a 
right to physician-assisted suicide under its state constitution.59 The 
Alaska Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion under its state 
constitution in 2001.60 Jack Kevorkian's renegade experiment in 
physician-assisted suicide and medical euthanasia ended in 1999 with 
his conviction of a second-degree charge in a euthanasia case 
(Dowbiggin, p. xi). Since 2001, the Bush Administration has 
attempted, so far without success, to halt Oregon's experiment with 
physician-assisted suicide by claiming that it violated the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (Smith, p. 276). 
As the only place in the United States where physicians can legally 
assist patients in committing suicide, Oregon has quietly proceeded 
with its experiment in doctor-aided death. Sixteen persons died by 
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon during 1998, the first year it was 
legal. The number rose to twenty-seven during each of the following 
two years, dropped to twenty-one in 2001, then rose to thirty-eight in 
2002, and forty-two in 2003.61 In any given year, about two-thirds of 
the patients who request and receive a prescription for lethal 
medication actually use the drugs.62 In reporting the higher figures for 
2002, an article in the state's largest newspaper noted: "Assisted 
suicide accounts for a tiny fraction of deaths in Oregon - about one 
in 1,000. The total remains lower than proponents expected and 
opponents feared in 1988 when Oregon became the only state to 
legalize physician-assisted suicide."63 In contrast, the rate of death by 
physician-assisted suicide or medical euthanasia is 100-times higher in 
the Netherlands (See Smith, p. 119). People using the Oregon law were 
mostly older state residents with cancer or Lou Gehrig's disease. Most 
58. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (describing such "experimentation" as "entirely proper" 
and "highly desirable"). 
59. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997). 
60. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88 (Alaska 2001) 
61. Don Colburn, Assisted Suicide Numbers Surge, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar. 
6, 2003, at Al (providing statistics for 1998 to 2002); John Schwartz & James Estrin, Jn 
Oregon, Choosing Death Over Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2004, at Fl (providing statistics 
for 2003 and on percentage of patients taking the drugs). 
62. Schwartz & Estrin, supra note 61, at Fl. 
63. Colburn, supra note 61, at Al. Similarly, in reporting the figures for 2003, the New 
York Times article commented, "Perhaps the most surprising thing to emerge from Oregon 
is how rarely the law has actually been used." Schwartz & Estrin, supra note 61, at Fl. 
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were white and had medical insurance.6 4 "It is almost as if Oregon 
were the calm center in the heart of the storm over this issue," 
commented Dr. Joanne Lynn, a national expert on end-of-life medical 
care who has staunchly opposed legalizing euthanasia.65 
In Forced Exit, Smith paints as bleak a picture as possible of the 
Oregon experiment, yet even he concedes that "it is hard to tell" how 
the law is working.66 If anything, the Oregon experience should lessen 
fears that physician-assisted suicide, once legalized, will expand 
beyond bounds. The lesson from Dowbiggin's history and the 
warnings in Smith's account notwithstanding, perhaps the procedure 
can be confined to consenting, terminally-ill adults. That has been the 
case in Oregon where, with few exceptions, the precise limits imposed 
by the Death with Dignity Act have been followed.67 
In his 1997 introduction to the first edition of Forced Exit, written 
before the Supreme Court decisions in Glucksberg and Quill, Smith 
foresaw a steady spread of physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia in 
The United States - he called it a "moral trickle-down" <smith, p. 
xxvP· In his 2003 introduction to the revised edition of the same book, 
he admitted that "it hasn't happened yet" (Smith, p. xii). "Why this 
turnaround when assisted suicide threatened to sweep the country?" 
he asked in the revised edition (Smith, p. 171>· The Supreme Court's 
decision in Glucksberg and Vacco must have been a critical factor. 
Smith characterizes them as "devastating losses for the assisted suicide 
movement" (Smith, p. 170). Dowbiggin suggests as much and speaks of 
the present "impasse" that the euthanasia movement has reached 
(Dowbiggin, pp. 173-76). Neither author elaborates on this point, and 
surely there were other factors involved. Yet just when the euthanasia 
movement appeared on the verge of a breakthrough following the 
passage of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act and victories in two 
federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court rulings stopped it cold, 
perhaps because they were unanimous, with forceful opinions from 
justices representing various judicial philosophies. Even though the 
justices expressed the hope and expectation that their constitutional 
ruling would not resolve the legal and political debate over physician­
assisted suicide, it seems to have done just that - at least in the short 
run. The credence given by all the justices to slippery-slope arguments 
against legalizing physician-assisted suicide may have given many 
people pause. De Tocqueville would have been impressed with the 
64. Colburn, supra note 61, at All; Facing Death, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar. 7, 
2003, at C12. 
65. Don Colburn, Assisted Suicide Rate is Steady, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Feb. 7, 
2001, at Al. 
66. Smith, pp.154-61 (quote at 154). 
67. The exceptions are so rare that even alleged ones make national news. See, e.g., John 
Schwartz, Questions on Safeguards in Suicide Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A22. 
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deference paid to judicial opinion, but perhaps not surprised. 
Remember his observation about statutes losing moral force in the 
United States once a judge finds them unconstitutional. Glucksberg 
and Quill offer the parallel instance of disputed statutes against 
assisting suicide gaining moral force when the Supreme Court upheld 
them as constitutional. 
